Perspective-taking is a stepping stone to human empathy. When empathizing with another individual, one can imagine how the other perceives the situation and feels as a result. To what extent does imagining the other differs from imagining oneself in similar painful situations? In this functional magnetic resonance imaging experiment, participants were shown pictures of people with their hands or feet in painful or non-painful situations and instructed to imagine and rate the level of pain perceived from different perspectives. Both the Self's and the Other's perspectives were associated with activation in the neural network involved in pain processing, including the parietal operculum, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; BA32) and anterior insula. However, the Self-perspective yielded higher pain ratings and involved the pain matrix more extensively in the secondary somatosensory cortex, the ACC (BA 24a /24b ), and the insula proper. Adopting the perspective of the Other was associated with specific increase in the posterior cingulate/precuneus and the right temporo-parietal junction. These results show the similarities between Self-and Other-pain representation, but most interestingly they also highlight some distinctiveness between these two representations, which is a crucial aspect of human empathy. It may be what allows us to distinguish empathic responses to others versus our own personal distress. These findings are consistent with the view that empathy does not involve a complete Self-Other merging.
Introduction
The issue of how we perceive the pain of other people provides an avenue for tackling the neural mechanisms involved in empathy. By virtue of its aversive properties, pain promotes the organism's health and integrity, and also provides a signal that motivates others to behave prosocially (e.g., to comfort or help). However, one does not need to feel the sensory aspect of pain to understand the plight of the person in need; imagining the distress of that individual is often sufficient to evoke feelings of concern. Recently, a number of neuroimaging studies on pain processing have demonstrated partial neural overlap between the experience of pain in Self and the observation of pain in Others (Botvinick et al., 2005; Morrison, Lloyd, di Pellegrino, & Roberts, 2004; Simon, Rainville, Craig, & Miltner, 2005; Singer et al., 2004) and the evaluation of pain for others (Jackson, Meltzoff, & Decety, 2005) .
Although the actual experience of pain and the perception of pain in other individuals tap similar brain regions, such as the ACC and anterior insula, different activation sites were also detected for Self and Other (Singer et al., 2004) . Interestingly, none of these above mentioned studies reported involvement of the somatosensory cortex in perceiving the pain of Others, contrary to what might be predicted from the perception-action hypothesis (see Jackson & Decety, 2004; Preston & de Waal, 2002) . The perception-action model posits that perception of emotion activates the neural mechanisms that are responsible for the generation of emotions. Such a system prompts the observer to resonate with the emotional state of another individual, with the observer activating the motor representations and associated autonomic and 
